Employment Discrimination Law After Muldrow: Seven Lessons from Fourth Circuit Courts

Last year, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a landmark decision in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, reshaping the landscape of employment discrimination law.

In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that an employee alleging a discriminatory job transfer need only demonstrate that the transfer caused “some harm” to a term or condition of employment. In doing so, the Court rejected the previous requirement to show “significant” or “material” harm. Employers are now left to wonder: what exactly counts as enough harm to constitute “some harm”?

The ruling left employers (and the lower courts) with a vague and confusing standard. The Court did not precisely define what types or degrees of harm would suffice, creating uncertainty around how to apply the “some harm” test in practice.

In the months since Muldrow was handed down, judges within the Fourth Circuit have started to test the decision’s reach. That includes not only the Fourth Circuit’s own published opinions, but also rulings from federal district courts within the Fourth Circuit, which is made up of Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia. Together, these opinions create a patchwork picture of how courts are grappling with Muldrow’s uncertainties.

Here are seven things we’ve learned about the fallout of Muldrow based on our analysis of the published opinions in the Fourth Circuit that have substantively addressed the case so far:

1. Muldrow is not limited to transfers. Actions such as a failure to promote, being placed on unpaid leave, and failure to accommodate religious requests can cause “some harm” and qualify as adverse actions.
2. The harm must still be linked to an identifiable term or condition of employment. While Muldrow’s “some harm” standard lowers the threshold for proving harm, the harm must still be linked to a term or condition of employment. Simply alleging conduct that one perceives as discriminatory is insufficient to constitute adverse action—the employee actually has to be worse off. Although Muldrow lowered the threshold, the harm must still be tied to a term or condition of employment. Dislike of a new role or speculation about future opportunities usually won’t suffice—except in Maryland, where courts have taken a more expansive view (see the next point).
3. Maryland district courts are interpreting Muldrow more liberally than other courts. Of the district courts to interpret Muldrow, the District of Maryland is taking the most flexible stance. In one case, the court found the standard met when an employee was reprimanded, reasoning that the reprimand could have limited future opportunities. That openness to speculation contrasts with North Carolina and Virginia courts, which require concrete evidence that the employee was actually worse off.
4. “Some harm” does not include everything that negatively impacts an employee. Micromanaging, yelling at an employee, criticizing, failing to give a performance evaluation, or conducting a supervisory investigation do not necessarily constitute adverse actions. The employee has to show how the employer tangibly impacted a term of employment.
5. Hostile work environment claims aren’t easier to prove under Muldrow. The “some harm” standard does not apply to hostile work environment claims. Employees who claim they were subjected to hostile work environments must still demonstrate the harassment was “severe and pervasive.”
6.  Comparators still matter. Even when an employee shows “some harm”—say, being denied a promotion—he must still demonstrate that a similarly situated, less qualified comparator was treated more favorably.
7. Muldrow does not just apply to claims under Title VII. Muldrow isn’t just a watershed case in the Title VII context (cases of discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin). Courts have applied the new “some harm” standard in the contexts of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).

The early lessons from the district courts in the Fourth Circuit confirm that while Muldrow lowered the bar, it did not eliminate it. Courts continue to require that employees show a real impact on the terms or conditions of their jobs, though Maryland decisions suggest some judges may tolerate speculation about harm.

Employers should expect continued uncertainty as more cases work their way through the system, but they can already see that the “some harm” standard is no free pass for plaintiffs. Staying alert to these developments is critical for compliance and risk management in this evolving area of employment law.

Cases Reviewed

Barnhill v. Bondi, 138 F.4th 123 (4th Cir. 2025)
Herkert v. Bisignano, -- F. 4th --, 2025 WL 2348704 (4th Cir. 2025)
Hansley v. DeJoy, 2024 WL 4947275, at *2 (4th Cir. Dec. 3, 2024)
Magassouba v. Prince George’s County, 773 F.Supp.3d 196 (D. Md. 2025)
Caudill v. North Carolina Symphony Society, Inc., 750 F.Supp.3d 531 (E.D.N.C. 2024)
Batchelor v. City of Wilson, 747 F. Supp. 3d 845 (E.D.N.C. 2024)
Rhoads v. Guilford Cnty., N. Carolina, 751 F. Supp. 3d 590 (M.D.N.C. 2024)
Couch v. City of Virginia Beach, 768 F. Supp. 3d 741 (E.D. Va. 2025)
Buck v. Modine Mfg. Co., 776 F.Supp.3d 357 (W.D. Va. 2025)

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