When Punishment Outpaces Justice: Proportionality and Punitive Damages

How much is “too much” when it comes to punishment?

From Virginia courts to the U.S. Supreme Court, judges have wrestled with punitive damages and the fine line between deterrence and excess. This article walks through the cases shaping proportionality and what they teach us about balancing justice.

“There is no greater tyranny than that which is perpetrated under the shield of law and in the name of justice.”
— Montesquieu

Montesquieu’s warning resonates deeply in modern litigation: justice loses its meaning when punishment outstrips fairness. There’s a natural instinct to respond to harm with overwhelming force. To make an example. To deter future misconduct. But in law, unchecked retaliation is not justice. It is chaos. For this reason, our justice system places strict guardrails around punitive damages. Virginia courts and the U.S. Supreme Court alike have been clear that proportionality isn’t optional; it’s foundational.

The Doctrine of Proportionality

Punitive damages exist to punish egregious conduct and deter future wrongdoing, but courts consistently emphasize that punishment must remain tethered to the harm actually proven. The Virginia Supreme Court has reaffirmed this principle, reviewing punitive awards under a structured, five-factor test:

1. Reasonableness between compensatory and punitive damages.
2. Measurement of punishment required given the conduct.
3. Avoiding double recovery for the same harm.
4. Proportionality of punitive damages to compensatory damages.
5. Defendant’s ability to pay.

This framework, established in Poulston v. Rock, 251 Va. 254 (1996), ensures that punishment never becomes disconnected from accountability.

Virginia’s Guardrails in Action

The Virginia Supreme Court has underscored that punitive damages must be assessed case-by-case, ensuring the award bears a reasonable relationship to the actual harm suffered by the plaintiff.[1] While there is no fixed formula, reasonableness is always required.

Contrast that idea with Coalson v. Canchola,[2] where the Court upheld a punitive-to-compensatory damages ratio approaching 18:1 — an outlier justified only by its extreme facts. In that case, the defendant:

• ignored direct police warnings not to drive,
• drove while intoxicated and on a revoked license,
• talked on his cell phone while behind the wheel,
• failed to yield the right of way,
• fled the scene after the crash, and
• urged his drinking companion not to reveal he had been drinking.

By emphasizing these egregious factors, the Court made clear that such high ratios are rare exceptions, not the rule.

The Federal Dimension: Due Process and Collective Punishment

Proportionality isn’t just a Virginia principle — it’s embedded in constitutional law. In Philip Morris USA v. Williams,[3] the U.S. Supreme Court held that punitive damages are not justified to punish a defendant for hypothetical harm. In other words, the generalized risk that a defendant had on the public may not be addressed in a punitive damages award. Doing so would deprive defendants of due process by holding them accountable for injuries never proven and victims never heard.

The Court recognized a deeper danger: when punishment is untethered from the specific harm at issue, it becomes collective rather than individual. The focus shifts from accountability to vengeance, and the very principles of fairness, restraint, and precision that underpin justice begin to erode.

Beyond the Courtroom

The lesson reaches far beyond punitive damages: when punishment eclipses responsibility, collateral damage becomes inevitable. Justice is precise by nature. It demands that punishment reach only those proven culpable — never those merely associated by identity, geography, or circumstance. When systems abandon that discipline, the lines between accountability and vengeance blur. What begins as a response to one wrong can spiral outward, magnifying harm rather than containing it.

[1] Baldwin v. McConnell, 273 Va. 650 (2007)

[2] Coalson v. Canchola, 287 Va. 242 (2014)

[3] Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007)